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Abstract
Web services are increasingly adopted in various domains, from finance
and e-government to social media. As they are built on top of the web tech-
nologies, they suffer also an unprecedented amount of attacks and exploita-
tions like the Web. Among the attacks, those that target SQL injection vul-
nerabilities have consistently been top-ranked for the last years. Testing to
detect such vulnerabilities before making web services public is crucial. We
present in this report an automated testing approach, namely µ4SQLi, and
its underpinning set of mutation operators. µ4SQLi can produce effective
inputs that lead to executable and harmful SQL statements. Executability
is key as otherwise no injection vulnerability can be exploited. Our eval-
uation demonstrated that the approach outperforms contemporary known
attacks in terms of vulnerability detection and the ability to get through an
application firewall, which is a popular configuration in real world.
1 Introduction
The Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) paradigm has been rapidly adopted in a
wide range of areas, from financial systems, business integration and e-government
to social media and end-user mobile applications. This shift has been further
accelerated by the rise of cloud-based systems. There are currently more than ten
thousand public web services (key units in the SOA) available1. The number is
even larger if we also consider private web services within and among institutions.
The popularity of SOA applications can be attributed to their continuous avail-
ability, interoperability, and flexibility. However, this also makes them attractive
to malicious users. The number of reported web vulnerabilities is growing sharply
[12]. Recent vulnerability reports found that web-based systems can receive up to
26 attacks per minute [5]. A security testing survey of publicly available web ser-
vices owned by companies such as Microsoft and Google found that at least 8% of
web services contained vulnerabilities [30]. These findings, together with the high
pressure of deadlines, suggest the need for automated security testing approaches
that can cope with the increasing security risks and the limited time and resources
allocated for testing.
Throughout the past decade, SQL injection (SQLi) vulnerabilities have been
consistently ranked by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)2
as the top security risks. SQLi attacks target database-driven systems by inject-
ing SQL code fragments into vulnerable input parameters that are not properly
checked and sanitised. These injected code fragments could change the applica-
tion’s behaviour if they flow into SQL statements exposing or changing the system’s
data.
A large body of work in the literature addresses SQLi vulnerabilities, e.g.,
[13, 20, 24, 25, 27, 32]. Some approaches perform vulnerability analysis, such
1Data reported by http://www.programmableweb.com, accessed January 11nd 2014.
2https://www.owasp.org
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as taint analysis [32, 34], to detect input fields that are not properly sanitised.
Such approaches link to specific languages and suffer from high false positive rates
and the dynamic typing and variable naming of the languages [8]. These white-
box approaches often require access and may need to modify source code, which
might not always be feasible when companies outsource the development of their
systems or acquire third-party components. Other approaches are black-box [1, 18]
but bounded to known attack patterns that tend to become out-dated very quickly
as the web evolves.
In this report we propose a black-box automated testing approach targeting
SQLi vulnerabilities, called µ4SQLi. Starting from a “legal” test case, our ap-
proach applies a set of mutation operators that are specifically designed to increase
the likelihood of generating successful SQLi attacks. More specifically, new attack
patterns are likely to be generated by applying multiple mutation operators on the
same input. Moreover, some of our mutation operators are designed to obfuscate
the injected SQL code fragments to bypass security filters, such as web applica-
tion firewalls (WAF), while others aim to repair SQL syntax errors that might
be caused by previous mutations. As a result, our approach can generate test
inputs that produce syntactically correct and executable SQL statements that can
reveal SQL vulnerabilities, if they exist. By producing SQLi attacks that bypass
the firewall and result in executable SQL statements we ensure to find exploitable
vulnerabilities as opposed to vulnerabilities that can not be exploited, for example
because a filter blocks all attacks. In addition, concrete sample attacks produced
by our approach can help developers to fix the source code or the security filter’s
configuration. Our approach is fully automated and supported by a tool called
Xavier3.
We have evaluated our approach on some open-source systems that expose web
service interfaces. Compared to a baseline approach, called Std, which consists of
an up-to-date set of 137 known SQLi attack patterns, our approach is faster and
is significantly more likely to detect vulnerabilities within a set time budget. As a
result, our approach has higher chance and is faster to detect vulnerabilities when
the time budget is limited. Moreover, when the subject systems are protected by
a WAF, none of the inputs generated by Std that reveal vulnerabilities can get
through the firewall, while our approach can still generate a good amount of inputs,
getting through the firewall and revealing all-but-one known vulnerabilities.
The remainder of this report is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a
background on SQLi vulnerabilities and reviews related work. Section 3 presents
our proposed mutation operators and security testing approach and tool. Section 4
presents the evaluation together with a discussion of results and threats to validity.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the work.
3Contact us for download
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2 Background and Related Work
This section provides a brief background on web services and SQLi vulnerabilities
and reviews previous work on SQLi testing.
2.1 Background
In systems that use databases, such as web-based systems, the SQL statements
that are used to access the back-end database are usually treated by the native
application code as strings. These strings are formed by concatenating different
string fragments based on user choices or the application’s control flow. Once the
SQL statement is formed, special functions are used to send the SQL statement
to the database server to be executed. For example, an SQL statement is formed
as follows (a simplified example from one of our web services in the case study):
$sql = "Select * From hotelList where country =’";
$sql = $sql . $country;
$sql = $sql . ’"’;
$result = mysql_query($sql) or die(mysql_error());
The variable $country is an input provided by the user, which is concatenated
with the rest of the SQL statement and then stored in the string variable $sql. The
string is then passed to the function mysql query that sends the SQL statement
to the database server to be executed.
SQLi is an attack technique in which attackers inject malicious SQL code frag-
ments into these input parameters. Such attacks are possible when input parame-
ters are used directly in SQL statements without proper validation or sanitisation.
An attacker might construct input values in a way that changes the behaviour
of the resulting SQL statement enabling the attacker to perform actions on the
database that were not intended by the application’s developer. These actions
could lead to exposure of sensitive data, insertion or alteration of data without
authorisation, loss of data or even taking control of the database server.
In the previous example, if the input $country has the value ’ or 1=1 –, the
resulting SQL statement would be:
Select * From hotelList where country=’’ or 1=1 --’
The first quote closes the existing quote in the statement and the double dash
at the end comments out the final quote, making the resulting SQL statement
syntactically valid. The clause or 1=1 is a tautology, i.e. the condition will
always evaluate to true bypassing the original condition in the where clause and
returning all rows in the table.
To avoid such attacks, application developers use filters and sanitisation tech-
niques to prevent malicious inputs from affecting the application’s behaviour. De-
velopers have to be careful not to block valid inputs that might resemble malicious
inputs. For example, a filter that rejects inputs with single quotes would protect
4
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
from the attack in the previous example. However, this filter will also reject valid
inputs where single quotes are part of a name (e.g., O’Brain).
Web services, the basic blocks for the service-oriented architecture, provide
facilities for the easy access and exchange of information across the Web. Each web
service provides a set of operations that can be invoked by clients. An operation
is similar to a method in traditional programming languages, it has a set of input
parameters and returns a structured output. The interface and features of a web
service are typically described by a publicly available Web Services Description
Language (WSDL) file.
In this report we consider SQLi vulnerabilities of the input parameters of a
service under test: an input parameter is vulnerable to SQLi attacks if it is used
in any SQL statement of the implementation of a service and if, through this
parameter, an attacker can send malicious inputs that can change the intended
logic of the SQL statement. To exploit such vulnerabilities, the attacker has to
provide inputs that result in executable SQL statements. Otherwise, the resulting
statements are rejected by the database, thus no access or changes to the data are
possible.
2.2 Related Work
Previous research on SQLi detection used both white-box and black-box approaches
to detect vulnerabilities. Several white-box approaches used taint analysis to iden-
tify invalidated inputs that flow into SQL statements [20, 25, 27, 32]. Fu and Qian
[13] suggested using symbolic execution to identify the constraints that need to be
satisfied to lead to an SQLi attack. Shar et al. [24] used data mining of the source
code to predict vulnerabilities. As well as requiring access to the source code,
which as we mentioned before might not always be possible, most of these ap-
proaches rely, in some aspects of their algorithms, on a set of known vulnerability
patterns.
Existing black-box approaches also rely on known injection patterns when gen-
erating test cases. Ciampa et al. [6] proposed an approach that analyses the
output, including error messages, of both legal and malicious test cases to learn
more about the type and structure of the back-end database. This information is
then used to craft attack inputs that are more likely to be successful at revealing
vulnerabilities. Antunes et al. [1, 2] also analysed the difference in the behaviour
of an application when using malicious and legal inputs to detect vulnerabilities.
Huang et al. [18] used a test generation approach that uses known attack patterns.
Known SQLi patterns have been enumerated and discussed by various academic
[1, 2, 14] and online security sources [29, 28]. However, relying on these patterns
might not be sufficient to test an application as attackers are always finding new
techniques to exploit vulnerabilities. Moreover, there might be a large number of
different representations for the same pattern, for example, using different encod-
ings.
Some approaches proposed run-time prevention techniques rather than testing
techniques. In the majority of these approaches [15, 16, 21, 26, 33], static analysis
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is used to collect all possible forms of SQL statements that can be produced by
the program. At run-time, if the structure of an SQL statement does not match
any of those collected forms, the statement is flagged as a potential attack. Sekar
[22] combined taint analysis and policies to detect injection attacks at run-time.
Run-time prevention approaches are complementary to testing approaches and can
also be used as an effective oracle for testing [3].
In our previous paper [3], we found that using run-time prevention techniques
as an oracle improved the detection rates for SQLi testing. We also identified the
need for a more sophisticated oracle that could reason about the exploitability of
a discovered vulnerability. In this work, we try to address this issue by enhancing
the oracle to evaluate the executability of a formed attack. A malicious input can
successfully evade all security mechanisms but the resulting attack could produce
an SQL statement that is not executable and, therefore, provides no evidence that
the vulnerability is exploitable.
Mutation testing has been proposed and studied extensively [19] as a method
of evaluating the adequacy of test suites where the program under test is mutated
to simulate faults. Shahriar and Zulkernine [23] defined SQLi specific mutation
operators to evaluate the effectiveness of a test suite in finding SQLi vulnerabilities.
Mutation analysis was also used by Fonseca et al. [11] to compare the effectiveness
of commercial security testing tools. The mutation operators we propose in this
report mutate test inputs to increase the likelihood of triggering vulnerabilities
rather than the program under test to evaluate the effectiveness of test suites in
finding faults.
Holler et al. [17] proposed an approach to test interpreters for security vulner-
abilities, such as memory safety issues, by mutating the input code. However, the
difference in the context and goal requires different mutation operators and test
generation techniques.
In this report, we propose a set of mutation operators that mutate inputs to
possibly form new unknown SQLi attacks for web services and address limitations
of previous approaches.
3 Approach
We propose an automated technique, namely µ4SQLi, for detecting SQLi vul-
nerabilities. Our technique rests on a set of mutation operators that manipulate
inputs (legitimate ones) to create new test inputs to trigger SQLi attacks. More-
over, these operators can be combined in different ways and multiple operators
can be applied to the same input. This makes it possible to generate inputs that
contain new attack patterns, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting vulnera-
bilities.
Specifically, we want to generate test inputs that can bypass web application
firewalls and result in executable SQL statements. A WAF may block SQLi attacks
and prevent a vulnerable web service from being exploited. Therefore, effective test
inputs need to get through the WAF in order to reach the service. Furthermore,
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they should lead to executable SQL statements as otherwise, security problems are
unlikely to arise since the database engine would reject them. And consequently,
no data would be leaked or compromised.
This section introduces our proposed mutation operators to generate test data.
For each mutation operator, along with its definition, a concrete example is pro-
vided. In some operators we discuss also their preconditions with respect to input
and previously applied operators. We will then discuss our test generation tech-
nique and the automated tool we developed to support the technique.
3.1 Mutation Operators
Mutation operators (MO) can be classified by their purpose into the following three
classes: Behaviour-changing, syntax-repairing and obfuscation. Table 1 provides a
summary of all mutation operators.
Table 1: Summary of mutation operators classified into behaviour-changing,
syntax-repairing, and obfuscation operators.
MO name Description
Behaviour-Changing Operators
MO or Adds an OR-clause to the input
MO and Adds an AND-clause to the input
MO semi Adds a semicolon followed by an additional SQL state-
ment
Syntax-Repairing Operators
MO par Appends a parenthesis to a valid input
MO cmt Adds a comment command (-- or #) to an input
MO qot Adds a single or double quote to an input
Obfuscation Operators
MO wsp Changes the encoding of whitespaces
MO chr Changes the encoding of a character literal enclosed in
quotes
MO html Changes the encoding of an input to HTML entity en-
coding
MO per Changes the encoding of an input to percentage encod-
ing
MO bool Rewrites a boolean expression while preserving it’s truth
value
MO keyw Obfuscates SQL keywords by randomising the capitali-
sation and inserting comments
3.1.1 Behaviour-changing
This class of mutation operators mutates inputs with the aim of changing the
application’s expected behaviour if the application is vulnerable to SQLi. For
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example, the mutated input could cause the application to return more database
rows than expected, exposing sensitive data to an unauthorized user. We define
the following behaviour-changing operators:
Operator: MO or
Adds OR x=x to the WHERE clause of a SQL statement where x is a random
number or a character enclosed in single or double quotes.
Rationale:
The conditions in a WHERE clause are used to limit the rows affected by
the SQL statement. By adding a condition that always evaluates to true
(tautology) to the WHERE clause, all rows in the relevant table(s) will be
affected, overriding any row filtering logic that was intended by the developer
of the application. This will return all data in the related tables in case of
a SELECT statement or delete/update all rows in case of a DELETE or
UPDATE statement.
Example: from original input: 1 ; MO or produces a mutated input: 1 OR
1=1. As a result, if the SQL statement that takes the input is predefined as
”SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input, the input will change the logic
of the statement and turns it as follows: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1
OR 1=1. This resulting statement will return all the data of table.
Operator: MO and
Adds AND x=y to the WHERE clause of a SQL statement where x and y are
random numbers or single characters enclosed in single or double quotes and
x is not equal to y.
Rationale:
By adding a contradiction to the WHERE clause, no rows will be affected by
the SQL statement. This type of malicious input cannot be used to exploit a
vulnerability but because the result of such input is known, this type of input
can be used to confirm that a vulnerability is present.
Preconditions:
MO or has not been applied.
Example: original input: 1, mutated input: 1 AND 1=2. That will turn, for
example, a predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input
to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1 AND 1=2, thus, changing the logic of
the original statement.
Operator: MO semi
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Adds a semicolon (;) followed by an additional SQL statement to the input.
The resulting query has the form sql stmt1; sql stmt2, where sql stmt1 is the
original SQL statement and sql stmt2 is an arbitrary SQL statement.
Rationale:
SQL statements separated by a semicolon are executed by the server from left
to right, unless an error is encountered. If this operator is applied successfully,
any SQL statement can be injected after the semicolon giving the attacker
complete control over the database if no other restrictions are applied (e.g.,
the database user has no privilege restrictions defined on the database level).
Example: original input: 1, mutated input: 1; SELECT waitfor(5) FROM dual.
This changes the predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=”
+ input to: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=1; SELECT waitfor(5) FROM
dual.
3.1.2 Syntax-repairing
As mentioned before, an SQLi attack aims to change the behaviour of the ap-
plication by injecting malicious inputs. Therefore, the malicious input itself is
expected to contain SQL statement fragments. This type of input, unlike regular
valid inputs, could cause a SQL syntax error when being combined with its tar-
gets, i.e., predefined SQL statements. Since the approach we propose is a black-box
technique, the predefined SQL statement syntax is unknown to the test generator
making it challenging to generate inputs that do not cause syntax errors. This
class of mutation operators mutates inputs with the goal of repairing SQL syntax
errors when they are encountered. The mutation operators we define in this class
are the following:
Operator: MO par
Appends a closing parenthesis to the end of an input.
Rationale:
In some cases, an input provided by the user is used as a parameter for a
SQL function call or within a nested SELECT statement. In such scenarios
the input is inserted within parenthesis, for example, func name(input). If
such input is vulnerable to injections, this vulnerability can only be exploited
when the opening parenthesis of the function call is matched with a closing
parenthesis. Otherwise, the injected input would be interpreted as part of the
function’s parameter, which might cause a syntax error or cause the injection
to have no effect on the application’s behaviour.
Example: original input: 67, mutated input: 67). When the input is further
mutated with MO or and MO cmt, the obtained mutated input will be: 67)
OR 1=1 -{}-. Let us consider a predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM ta-
ble WHERE character=CHR(” + input + ”)”, where function CHR converts an
integer to its corresponding Unicode character. The changed SQL statement: SE-
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LECT * FROM table WHERE character=CHR(67) OR 1=1 – ).
Operator: MO cmt
Adds a SQL comment (double dashes -- and the hash character #) to the
input. Any SQL that follows a comment is not executed.
Rationale:
A SQL comment can be useful to repair syntax errors that were caused by
previous mutations. By appending a SQL comment at the end of the mutant,
everything following the comment will be ignored by the parser, which might
help fixing SQL syntax errors.
Preconditions:
Another operator, such as MO par, has been previously applied and caused a
syntax error.
Example: original input: 67, after being mutated with MO or and MO par:
67) OR 1=1. This changes the predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM table
WHERE character=CHR(” + input + ”)” to a combined statement, which causes
a syntax error: SELECT * FROM table WHERE character=CHR(67) OR 1=1).
We then apply MO cmt to obtain: 67) OR 1=1 #. The final statement:
SELECT * FROM table WHERE character=CHR(67) OR 1=1 #) Applying this
mutation causes the last parenthesis to be ignored by the parser, thereby avoiding
parser error due to the unbalanced number of parentheses.
Operator: MO qot
Adds either a single quote (’) or a double quote (”) to the mutant.
Rationale:
If an input that is vulnerable to injections is of type string, it may be enclosed
in single or double quotes in the predefined SQL statement. The SQL parser
will treat the mutant, including the injected SQL, as a string literal and will
not execute any SQL commands within the mutant. To be able to exploit
the vulnerability, we have to first exit the string context by closing any open
quotes before any SQL commands can be injected.
Example: original input: Smith, mutated with MO or: Smith OR 1=1. This
changes the predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM table WHERE name=’” +
input + ”’” to aombined statement, which does not result in the desired change of
behavior, since the mutant is treated as a string literal: SELECT * FROM table
WHERE name=’Smith OR 1=1’). After being further mutated with MO qot
and MO cmt: Smith’ OR 1=1 #, the final statement is SELECT * FROM table
WHERE name=’Smith’ OR 1=1 #), which is syntactically correct and changes
the logic of the original statement.
3.1.3 Obfuscation
Some applications employ input filters to defend against SQLi attacks. A filter
examines every input to check for suspicious string patterns typically used in an
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SQLi attacks, such as SQL keywords, and rejects any such inputs. For example,
a filter uses a blacklist that defines forbidden characters or strings to decide if
an input is suspicious. Obfuscation mutation operators try to avoid filtering by
mutating an input to a semantically equivalent input but in a different form. This
might prevent the filter from recognizing the forbidden characters/strings in the
mutated input. We define the following obfuscation mutation operators:
Operator: MO wsp
Replaces a whitespace with a semantically equivalent character (+, /**/, or
unicode encodings: %20, %09, %0a, %0b, %0c, %0d and %a0).
Rationale:
An application might filter inputs that contain string patterns known to be
used in SQLi attacks, for example, a single quote followed by a whitespace.
Representing the whitespace in a different encoding might cause the malicious
input to bypass this filter.
Preconditions:
The input contains at least one whitespace.
Example: original input: 1 OR 1=1, mutated input: 1+OR+1=1. This changes
the predefined statement: ”SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input to
SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1+OR+1=1.
Operator: MO chr
Replaces a character literal enclosed in quotes (’c’ ) with an equivalent rep-
resentation, where c is an arbitrary printable ASCII character. Equivalent
representations are:
• Short binary representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with b’1100001’.
• Long binary representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with
binary’1100001’.
• Unicode representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with n’a’.
• Hexadecimal representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with x’61’.
Rationale:
If a filter rejects a mutant generated by a behaviour-changing mutation oper-
ator which contains a character literal, this operator can be used to obfuscate
the mutant. For example, MO or generates mutants with a tautology, e.g. OR
’a’=’a’. A filter may be configured to identify suspicious inputs by checking
for a tautology pattern. To avoid this filter, this operator changes the rep-
resentation of one of the tautology’s operands, while preserving the semantic
meaning. For example, OR ’a’=’a’ could be mutated to OR ’a’=x’61’, where
x’61’ is the hexadecimal representation of ’a’. This new mutant might not be
recognized as a tautology by the filter and, therefore, avoid filtering.
Preconditions:
A behaviour-changing mutation operator, which contains a character literal,
has been previously applied.
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Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mu-
tated with MO chr: 1 OR ’a’=x’61’. This changes the predefined statement:
”SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input to: SELECT * FROM table
WHERE id=1 OR ’a’=x’61’.
Operator: MO html
Changes the encoding of a mutant using HTML entity encoding. In HTML
entity encoding, a character can be encoded in two ways: (i) numeric character
reference in the form &#N where N is the character’s code position in the
used character set in decimal or hexadecimal representation; (ii) Character
entity reference [31] in the form &SymbolicName. For example, &quot; is the
encoding for the single quote character (’).
Rationale:
Using HTML entity encoding might help evade a filter that is designed to reject
a certain character, but does not recognize the same character if received in
HTML entity encoding.
Preconditions:
For character entity reference encoding, only characters with symbolic names
can be encoded.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mutated
with MO html: 1 OR &quot;a&quot; = &quot;a&quot;. This turns the prede-
fined statement: ”SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input to: SELECT *
FROM table WHERE id=1 OR &quot;a&quot; = &quot;a&quot;.
Operator: MO per
Changes the encoding of a mutant using percent encoding:%HH, where HH
is a two digit hexadecimal value referring to the character’s ASCII code. For
example, the single quote character (’) is encoded as %27.
Rationale:
Using percent encoding is useful if a filter rejects a certain character, but does
not recognize the same character if received in percent encoding.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mu-
tated with MO per: 1 OR%20’a’=’a’. This turns the predefined statement: ”SE-
LECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input to SELECT * FROM table WHERE
id=1
OR%20’a’=’a’.
Operator: MO bool
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Replaces a boolean expression with an equivalent boolean expression. For
example, the boolean expression 1=1 which is used in MO or could be obfus-
cated as not false=!!1. Both expressions evaluate to true, which maintains the
same semantic meaning of the mutant after obfuscation.
Rationale:
A filter might be configured to look for and reject certain boolean expressions
which are used as part of a request frequently used in SQLi attacks, e.g.,
a tautology. By obfuscating the boolean expression, the filter might fail to
recognise the attack, making it possible to perform it.
Preconditions:
Can only be applied to input values that contain a boolean expression.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO or: 1 OR 1=1, further mutated
with MO bool: 1 OR not false=!!1. This turns the predefined statement ”SE-
LECT * FROM table WHERE id=” + input to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE
id=1 OR not false=!!1.
Operator: MO keyw
Obfuscates SQL keywords and operators using different techniques: Randomly
changing the case of some letters, adding comments in the middle of a keyword
or replacing a keyword with an alternative representation. Most SQL parsers
are case insensitive, e.g. the keyword select, SELECT or SeLeCt are all valid.
Some parsers accept keywords which contain a comment in the middle of
the keyword (e.g. sel/*comment here*/ect). Finally, some keywords have
alternative forms, e.g. OR can also be expressed as ——.
Rationale:
A filter might be configured to reject a request that contains any SQL keyword,
since SQL keywords are frequently used in SQLi attack strings. By obfuscating
the SQL keywords in an input, the filter may fail to recognise those keywords,
making the attack successful.
Preconditions:
The input value contains at least one SQL keyword.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO or: 1 OR 1=1, further mutation
with MO keyw: 1 —— 1=1. This changes the predefined statement: ”SELECT
* FROM table WHERE id=” + input to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1
—— 1=1.
3.2 Test Generation
Multiple mutation operators from different classes can be applied to a single in-
put parameter to generate desired input vectors. The aim is to detect subtle
vulnerabilities that can only be triggered with an input generated by combining
multiple mutation operators. For example, consider an application that filters in-
puts by searching for known attack patterns that can be generated using one of the
behaviour-changing operators. To form a successful attack, it is necessary to first
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apply the behaviour-changing operator and then apply one or more obfuscation
operators.
Each chain of mutations has to start from a valid test case, which satisfies the
input validations of the application under test. Starting from a valid test case
ensures that we avoid generating test cases that would be directly rejected by the
application due to dependencies between inputs or complex input structures that
are unlikely to be generated randomly. Valid test cases have the benefit of being
more likely to satisfy input validations and reach critical parts of the application,
such as SQL queries. For example, if an application expects a credit card number
together with other inputs, which we wish to mutate, the credit card number has
to follow a well-defined format; otherwise the test case would be instantly rejected.
Algorithm 1 formally defines the test generation algorithm: Starting from a
valid test case, each input is mutated a predefined number of times. The function
Apply MO (Line 4) randomly applies one or more mutation operator(s) to the
current Input. The function uses a simple grammar that defines the different
legal ways to combine operators. The operation under test is then called with the
updated test case TC′. If the oracle flags a vulnerability, all SQL statements that
were issued as a result of the call are checked. If the percentage of executable
SQL statements (i.e., statements that do not contain a syntax error) is above a
predefined threshold, the input is reported as vulnerable and the test case is saved
to help the test engineer in debugging and fixing the vulnerability (Line 5-8).
Algorithm 1 Test Generation Algorithm:
Input TC: A test case: ArrayOf(Input)
OP: A web service operation to be tested
Output TS: Test Suite for SQLi vulnerabilities
V: Set of vulnerable inputs
1: TS = ∅
2: for each Input in TC do
3: while max tries not reached do
4: TC′ = apply MO(TC,Input)
5: if call(OP,TC′) = VulnrFlagged then
6: if executable SQL ≥ P then
7: V = V ∪ Input
8: TS = TS ∪ TC′
9: end if
10: end if
11: end while
12: end for
13: return TS, V
Figure 1 shows an example of a SOAP message (a test case) generated by our
approach. Here the input values of the parameters minPrice, maxPrice, and start
are kept from the original test case, while the input value of the parameter country
has been mutated to contain a SQLi attack.
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<soapenv:Envelope>
  <soapenv:Header/>
  <soapenv:Body>
    <urn:getRoomsByRate>
  <minPrice xsi:type="xsd:float">100</minPrice>
  <maxPrice xsi:type="xsd:float">400</maxPrice>
  <country xsi:type="xsd:string">"||not 0--</country>
  <start xsi:type="xsd:integer">1</start>
    </urn:getRoomsByRate>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
Figure 1: Example of a generated test case, the parameter country contains a
mutated SQLi attack.
To decide if a vulnerability is detected, we use two approaches: First we use a
run-time prevention tool (database proxy). Database proxies reside between the
database and the application and monitor every issued statement for SQLi attacks.
Once a vulnerability is flagged, we examine all SQL statements that were issued on
that specific call to check how many statements are executable. This is to check if
the generated inputs caused syntax errors and, therefore, do not provide evidence
that a vulnerability is exploitable, as discussed before.
3.3 Test Oracle
When a malicious input is sent to a target system, it may result in making the
system misbehave if successful. In most cases, the manifestation of abnormal
behaviours can be observed though the results the target system returns (e.g.,
web pages showing unintended content) or through the surrounding environment
(e.g., crashes, illegal calls to the operating system, or unintended accesses to
data). In our experiments, because of our focus on SQL injections, we deploy
a database proxy that intercepts the communication between the target system
and its database, to identify if an input is potentially harmful or not. For exam-
ple, we can use GreenSQL 4 for this purpose. A previous study that compared
GreenSQL to five similar tools has found it to be the most effective in detecting
SQL injection attacks [10].
Details of using a database proxy as oracle has been discussed in our previ-
ous work [3]. Typically, a database proxy is deployed and trained with normal
database accesses. Such training data are the results of regular usage of the sys-
tems or the execution of existing functional test suites. Based on the training
data, the proxy learns regular patterns of legal SQL statements. Once trained,
the proxy will continue observing the traffic between the system and its database
and raise alarms when identifying suspicious database queries. Each alarm corre-
4http://www.greensql.com
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sponds to one database SQL statement, and one test case can result in multiple
SQL statements and thus multiple alarms. To avoid false positives due to incom-
plete training, manual inspection may be needed to verify that all SQL statements
flagged did actually point to a vulnerability in the system and were not legal
statements which had simply not been learned.
3.4 Tool
The presented mutation approach has been implemented as a Java tool, called
Xavier5. It can be used to test SOAP-based web services for SQLi vulnerabilities.
Figure 2 shows the key components of the tool (Test generator and Monitor) and
how it is used in practice. The test generator takes as inputs the WSDL file of the
web service under test and a sample test case for each web service operation that
has to be tested. Such a sample test case can be easily generated by professional
tools, such as SoapUI6, or by existing approaches [4]. The tool, then, examines
the sample test case to find all input parameters for an operation and replaces
each parameter, one at a time, with an SQLi attack generated with our mutation
approach. The modified test case will be sent to the web service under test (the
SUT in the figure). In some settings, there could be a web application firewall (the
WAF component) deployed in between the test generator and the SUT. The goal
of the WAF is to protect the SUT from malicious attacks. The oracle component
(the DB proxy component in the figure) observes the interactions between the
SUT and its database to detect malicious SQL statements. Finally, the Monitor
component of Xavier constantly queries the oracle component to know whether
generated inputs reveal a SQLi vulnerability.
In Xavier, we integrate, as DB proxy oracle, a database security suite, called
GreenSQL7, that intercepts the SQL statements sent between the web service ap-
plication and its database. The database proxy uses a learning approach to detect
SQLi vulnerabilities. Therefore, the proxy has to be trained in a learning phase
to recognise legal SQL statements. In the detection phase, the proxy considers all
intercepted statements, which have not been learned previously, as SQLi attacks.
Thus, a test case is said to reveal a vulnerability if the intercepted SQL statements
are malicious.
Every suspected malicious statement is further analysed if it forms syntactically
correct SQL. An attacker is only able to exploit a SQLi vulnerability, if he can
inject the malicious input in such a way that the resulting SQL statement is
free of syntax errors. Otherwise, the attacker is unable to reach his goal, e.g.,
to obtain/modify data or change the application’s control flow, if the malicious
statement is not executed. The tool MySQL-Proxy8 is used to monitor if a SQL
statement has been executed or if there was an error during execution.
5Contact us for download
6http://www.soapui.org
7http://www.greensql.com
8http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.1/en/mysql-proxy.html
16
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
WAF SUT
Monitor
Data
base
Test 
generator
XAVIER
DB
ProxyWSDL
Input 
samples 
test reports
Figure 2: Components of Xavier and how Xavier is used in practice.
4 Experiments and Results
We have evaluated the effectiveness of our approach on two open source systems
and in two different settings: with and without the presence of a web application
firewall (WAF). The main motivation for the latter is that, in most contexts,
including those of our industry partners, such a firewall is typically present (or
sometimes integrated) and is the first protection layer encountered by attackers.
Such situations are therefore deemed more realistic. The firewall deployed in our
experiment is ModSecurity with the OWASP Core Rule Set (version 2.2.0). As
the baseline for our evaluation, we considered a comprehensive list of known SQLi
attack patterns since, in practice, this is what penetration testers typically use.
We aim at evaluating the performance of our proposed mutation technique in
comparison with standard attacks. More specifically, we investigate the following
research questions:
RQ1: Are standard attacks and mutated inputs (generated by µ4SQLi) likely to
reveal exploitable SQLi vulnerabilities?
RQ2: With and without the presence of the WAF, which input generation tech-
nique performs better?
4.1 Subject Applications
Two open-source subjects, namely HotelRS and SugarCRM were used in our
experiments. HotelRS was created by researchers to study service-oriented archi-
tectures and was used in previous studies [7]. SugarCRM is a popular customer
relationship management system (received 189K+ downloads as of 20139). These
systems provide web service APIs to the external world. Such interfaces allow
other systems, namely service consumers, to access to the business functionality
and data of the subject systems. However, they are also target for SQLi attacks
if the inputs through those interfaces are inadequately treated.
9http://sourceforge.net
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Table 2: Size in terms of web service operations, parameters, and lines of code of
the subject applications.
Application #Operations #Parameters #LoC
HotelRS 7 21 1,566
SugarCRM 26 87 352,026
Total 33 108 353,592
Table 2 provides information about the number of operations, input parameters
and lines of code for the chosen applications. In terms of size in number of lines
of code, HotelRS and SugarCRM, with 1.5KLoCs and 352KLoCs respectively,
are not particularly large but they provide a respectable number of services with
many input parameters, with known vulnerabilities. SugarCRM and HotelRS
are both implemented using PHP, use a MySQL database, and provide a SOAP-
based Web Service API. Those are popular technologies used in the implementation
of many web services.
4.2 Treatments
We refer to the baseline approach consisting of 137 known attack patterns as Std
(Standard attacks). Such patterns were consolidated in a repository of SQLi attack
patterns [1]. They include different contemporary categories of attacks, such as
Boolean-based, UNION query-based. In the context of our study, the whole set of
attack patterns of Std is applied for every individual input parameter. The second
treatment used in our study is our approach, µ4SQLi.
4.3 Variables
We used GreenSQL 10 as the oracle (database proxy) for the generated test inputs
of Std and µ4SQLi. To train GreenSQL, we have created a test suite for each of
the subjects consisting of a wide range of legitimate input values. To avoid false
positives due to incomplete training, in our experiments, we manually verified that
all SQL statements flagged by GreenSQL did actually point to a vulnerability in
the system and were not legal statements which had simply not been learned.
Given a set of test cases targeting a specific web service parameter, we define
T as the total number of test cases that generate SQL statements that are flagged
(alarm) by the database proxy. Among these tests, we further investigate if their
generated SQL statements are executable or not. We refer to Te for the total
number of tests that can lead to flagged and executable SQL statements. To
compare Std and µ4SQLi, we need to consider both T and Te, as we will see
that looking at T alone (as do many studies in the literature) would lead to very
different conclusions since only executable SQL statements can be exploitable.
Non-executable statements can be generated because the corresponding inputs,
10http://www.greensql.com
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after being processed by a target, result in syntax-errors. Such statements hardly
have a security impact since the database engine would reject them and, hence,
no data would be leaked or compromised.
If a technique yields higher Te, it is considered to be more effective at detecting
exploitable vulnerabilities. In other words, when Te is high, it is more likely to
detect exploitable vulnerabilities for a test suite of fixed size. Moreover, it is also
likely to detect vulnerabilities faster, i.e., we need a smaller number of tests to
be executed in order to detect the vulnerabilities. This, in practice, is important
when dealing with a large number of services and input parameters.
Since one test case can give rise to multiple SQL statements, we need to de-
termine how to compute Te when there is a mix of executable and non-executable
statements. Since, in practice, one single flagged and executable statement gener-
ated by a specific input can entail serious consequences, when more SQL statements
are executable, the chance to uncover vulnerabilities is higher. In our analysis, with
the intent of being conservative in our results, a test t is considered to be part of
Te if and only if all the flagged statements generated by t are executable.
4.4 Results
We ran µ4SQLi and Std on every parameter of the two selected subjects, Sug-
arCRM and HotelRS. There are in total 108 input parameters for all their web
services. As described earlier, Std entails 137 test executions for every param-
eter, whereas with µ4SQLi, since it is non-deterministic, we need to run more
test executions to account for randomness. To do so in an efficient way, given the
substantial execution time (about 5.7 hours per vulnerable parameter on a virtual
machine of 1Gb RAM and 2,6Ghz CPU) we generated and ran 1000 tests for each
parameter. We, then, adopted a Bootstrapping approach (sampling with replace-
ment) [9] and formed 10k test suites (each has 137 tests) by sampling from these
1000 tests, so that each test suite would be comparable with Std with respect to
Te. In the tables 3 and 4, we report the percentage of T and Te for Std on each
subject and their average percentage for µ4SQLi over 10k test suites. We only
report results for vulnerable input parameters as per the results of the two test
techniques and after being confirmed through manual inspection.
Table 3 shows our results when subjects were not protected by the WAF. The
first and second column indicate the subjects and their vulnerable parameters,
the subsequent columns show the percentage of tests that generate flagged SQL
statements (%T ) and the percentage of such flagged tests (out of 137) that also
lead to executable SQL statements (%Te). For µ4SQLi, as indicated, such per-
centages are averages over 10k test suites. For HotelRS, both techniques find
six SQLi vulnerabilities. With regards to the parameter country, 12.41% of 137
test cases provided by Std are flagged by GreenSQL as SQLi attacks and, among
them, 5.84% generate executable SQL statements. Results for the remaining five
parameters found to be vulnerable by Std are identical: 35.04% of the tests lead to
SQL statements being flagged by GreenSQL and among them, 9.49% generate ex-
ecutable SQL statements. While µ4SQLi and Std detect the same vulnerabilities,
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Table 3: Results of Std and µ4SQLi on the subject applications when no WAF
is enabled.
Subject Parameter Std µ4SQLi
%T %Te %T (avg) %Te (avg)
HotelRS country 12.41 5.84 40.62 21.80
arrDate 35.04 9.49 42.05 12.50
depDate 35.04 9.49 42.96 12.03
name 35.04 9.49 43.36 12.91
address 35.04 9.49 39.81 11.00
email 35.04 9.49 41.73 11.24
SugarCRM value 37.23 0.0 41.48 22.51
ass user id 32.85 8.03 42.49 13.91
query1 32.85 3.65 9.82 0.30
query2 54.74 5.84 81.72 33.45
order by 59.85 10.95 85.98 33.55
rel mod qry 47.45 2.92 49.79 0.00
%T and %Te are higher for µ4SQLi: across reported parameters, T ranges from
39.81% to 43.36% and Te from 11% to 21.80%. For SugarCRM, both techniques
detect five out of six vulnerabilities, but both Std and µ4SQLi failed to generate
an executable SQL statement for one parameter, that is value and rel mod query,
respectively. Except for parameter query1 µ4SQLi has always a higher T mea-
sure. Similarly, µ4SQLi has a higher Te measure for all parameters except for
query1 and rel mod query.
Even when using µ4SQLi, %Te is generally lower than %T across input pa-
rameters. However, it is large enough to be highly likely to detect an exploitable
vulnerability by running a few dozens test cases or less, as only one flagged test
case leading to an executable SQL statement is enough to demonstrate the vul-
nerability of a parameter. Taking the parameter ass user id as an example, with
a average %Te of 13.91%, running 50 test cases would yield a very small proba-
bility, 0.0006 (i.e., (1− 0.1391)50), of missing the vulnerability. %T is typically
much larger than %Te, thus showing that generating executable SQL statements
is rather difficult.
Table 4 shows the results of the experiments when the subjects were protected
by the WAF. For HotelRS, once again, both approaches were able to generate,
for each vulnerable parameter, SQLi statements which was flagged by GreenSQL
(%T ¿ 0). However, one important difference is that only µ4SQLi was able to
generate test cases which lead to executable SQL statements. Std failed to do so
for all tested parameters. Similarly, for SugarCRM, %T is significantly higher
for µ4SQLi than Std. And once again, only µ4SQLi was able to generate test
cases that led to executable SQL statements for five out six vulnerable parameters
(except rel mod qry), whereas Std failed to do so for all tested parameters. Our
conclusions are similar to the results when no WAF is present, except that %T and
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Table 4: Results of Std and µ4SQLi on the subject applications protected by the
WAF.
Subject Parameter Std µ4SQLi
%T %Te %T (avg) %Te (avg)
HotelRS country 0.73 0.0 36.84 20.69
arrDate 2.19 0.0 35.91 9.11
depDate 5.84 0.0 36.59 11.42
name 6.57 0.0 38.34 11.72
address 7.30 0.0 39.67 9.64
email 6.57 0.0 36.33 9.88
SugarCRM value 2.19 0.0 37.42 20.48
ass user id 5.11 0.0 29.35 6.89
query1 0.73 0.0 8.97 0.20
query2 3.65 0.0 76.56 31.43
order by 7.30 0.0 80.08 31.96
rel mod qry 6.57 0.0 44.82 0.0
%Te tend to be lower with a WAF. This is to be expected as some of the attacks
generated are filtered out by the WAF.
Regarding the performance of µ4SQLi on the parameter query1, the vulnera-
bility, though not impossible to find, is still extremely difficult to detect (only 0.3%
of test cases can uncover it). Further work is needed to investigate the reasons.
We further examined why µ4SQLi experienced, for parameter rel mod qry, a
sharp drop from T (49.72% without WAF) to Te (0%). µ4SQLi failed to trigger
an executable statement for this parameter since, given the SQL statement into
which the test case is injected, non of the mutation operators could possibly result
in a syntactically correct statement. The vulnerable statement is:
SELECT opportunity id id FROM accounts opportunities , opportunities WHERE
[...] AND <test case inserted here> AND [...]
The injection occurs in the where clause of the SQL statement. MO or and
MO and are the mutation operators that target SQLi vulnerabilities in the where
clause. For both of these operators, all generated mutants for this particular SQL
statement begin either with a single quote or a double quote, e.g. ”——’d’=’d’–
or ’ or 1, but since their is no matching opening single or double quote an syntax
error is introduced. For example, once concatenated with the mutant the statement
becomes:
SELECT opportunity id id FROM accounts opportunities , opportunities WHERE
[...] AND ”——’d’=’d’– AND [...]
This problem can be solved by improving how the mutation operators append
a clause. For example, in this particular case, starting the mutant with a number
instead of a quote prevents a syntax error. With this additional fix, the vulnerabil-
ity will be detected. More generally, we expect that the performance of µ4SQLi
will be further improved once we improve the mutation operators.
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Answering the research question RQ1, we can see that both techniques can, in
most cases, reveal vulnerabilities (%Te > 0) when the subjects were not protected
by the WAF. However, when they are protected, only µ4SQLi can reveal such
vulnerabilities (in 10 out of 12 parameters) while Std revealed none of them.
Such a difference is highly significant as it has many practical implications to be
discussed below.
RQ1: Both the mutation-based technique and the standard attack patterns
can reveal SQLi vulnerabilities when no firewall was used. Most vulnera-
bilities are highly likely to be detected with at most a few dozen test cases
or less
To provide a better view of the comparison between the two input generation
techniques, we produced a set of plots. All of them are available in the appendix.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the results when the subjects were protected with a WAF.
The box-plots depict the results of µ4SQLi (recall it is non-deterministic) in terms
of %T (lower part) and %Te (upper part). The dash and triangle dots are the result
of Std. As we can see, without having to resort to a statistical test, the differences
are clearly significant. In the upper part of the figures, none of the tests generated
by Std could result in executable SQL statements and therefore missed all the
vulnerabilities. By contrast, µ4SQLi missed only one of the vulnerabilities in
SugarCRM. In short, from the figures and above tables, we can see that the
performance of µ4SQLi in terms of generating tests that lead to flagged and
executable SQL statements is significantly better than Std.
RQ2: Our mutation-based technique (µ4SQLi) generates a higher per-
centage of tests that can reveal SQLi vulnerabilities. Further, in the pres-
ence of a WAF, µ4SQLi is the only technique that is capable of doing
so.
4.5 Discussion
Results without the WAF indicate that both approaches can detect vulnerabil-
ities in the examined subjects. Both techniques were able to provide, for most
vulnerable parameters, test cases leading to SQL statements that are flagged by
GreenSQL and deemed executable. It is interesting to note, however, that a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of test cases generated flagged and executable statements
when using µ4SQLi. The practical implications of these results is that, since the
execution time of a test case generated by either Std or µ4SQLi is comparable,
when testing many services with many input parameters, µ4SQLi will be a more
effective and less costly technique to detect exploitable vulnerabilities. They will
be more likely to be detected within a fixed test budget and will be detected faster.
Results with the WAF are even more dramatic. Only µ4SQLi is able, for all
parameters but one, to generate flagged and executable SQL statements. Since
the presence of a WAF or similar protection mechanism is a much more realistic
situation in practice, these results imply that in many situations, standard attacks
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Figure 3: Results obtained from HotelRS with firewall enabled: the box-plots
depict the results of µ4SQLi, the dashed line depicts the results of Std. None of
the executable SQL statements generated by Std can get through the WAF.
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Figure 4: Results obtained from SugarCRM with the firewall enabled.
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are not effective when looking for tangible evidence that there are exploitable SQLi
vulnerabilities.
When the subjects were protected by the WAF, there was an even more
contrasting difference in the results of the techniques. With the WAF enabled,
µ4SQLi achieved results that are similar to when no WAF was used: T and Te
experienced only a slight drop. That difference was due to the WAF identifying
and blocking only a small number of attacks. This is an evidence that the pro-
posed obfuscation mutation operators are effective at bypassing the WAF. On the
contrary, the test results for Std dropped considerably. T experienced a large drop
and Te went down to zero. This can be attributed to the WAF recognising most
of the test cases as SQLi attacks and blocking them. The low percentage of test
cases which bypass the firewall do not result in executable SQL statements.
Overall, the results indicate that the obfuscation and syntax-repairing have
helped µ4SQLi in bypassing the WAF and triggering executable SQLi attacks.
4.6 Threats to Validity
The potential threats to validity of our results fall into the internal and external
categories:
Internal threats: This is about whether the associations we observed between
treatments (test techniques) and generated executable SQL statements can be
confidently interpreted as due to the inherent properties of the techniques. For
Std we used a comprehensive list of 137 known attack patterns mentioned in [1].
As far as we are aware, this is the state of the art for penetration testing in practice.
Regarding µ4SQLi, since it is non-deterministic and to account for randomness, we
generated and ran 1000 tests per parameter and then sampled (with replacement,
a procedure called Bootstrapping) 10K test suites of 137 test cases to enable a
statistical comparison with standard attacks. We have also inspected the reports
of GreenSQL to remove any false alarms.
We chose ModSecurity as a WAF and used the OWASP Core Rule Set. This
is a popular setting in practice used in many production systems.
External threats: This concerns the generalization of the results. Obviously,
like any study in specific systems, it needs to be replicated. The computation
cost of running such experiments is however high and, although we only used two
systems in the experiments, them are from different domains and SugarCRM is
used by real users as the number of downloads indicates. Although we compared
only two test techniques, they are representative of the state of the art in black-box
SQLi testing, as the review of related works indicates.
5 Conclusion
SQL injections have been ranked among the most common categories of vulner-
abilities. Attacks that exploit such type of vulnerabilities increase rapidly over
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time. Automated testing techniques are important, not only to detect vulnerabil-
ities in web services before they can be published, but also to reduce testing effort
in contexts where the numbers of services and their input parameters are large.
In particular, there is a need for black-box techniques that do not require access
to the source code, as this is a common constraint when third party components
are used or software development is (partly) outsourced. Existing techniques that
have investigated this specific problem are bounded to known attack patterns that
become out-dated very quickly, especially given the fast evolution of web services
and their underpinning technologies. Their performance may also be limited by
the presence of application protection mechanisms, such as firewalls, which may
block known attacks. Our results confirm this problem by showing that state-of-
practice, standard attacks do not, in most cases, make it through the firewall. In
addition, the few that were not blocked by the firewall lead to non-executable SQL
statements because of syntax errors.
We presented in this report an automated mutation technique for SQL injec-
tion vulnerabilities, supported by a tool, which focuses on mutating the input
values of web service parameters. This technique makes use of a set of mutation
operators that are able (1) to generate inputs with a high likelihood of modifying
the behaviour of services, (2) to correct inputs to remove possible syntax errors
due to mutations, and (3) to obfuscate attacks to increase their chances to make it
though the firewall. The ultimate goal of our technique is to generate randomised
inputs to detect SQL vulnerabilities by the way of SQL statements that are exe-
cutable, are passing the firewall, and are unduly revealing or compromising data
in the database. Our experimental results have demonstrated that our technique
and tool performed much better than state-of-practice standard attack patterns,
and that the probability of detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities is high, even in
the presence of a firewall, and with a reasonable number of test case executions
for each input parameter in each service.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg (grant
FNR/P10/03 and FNR4800382). We specially thank the testing and security team
of our industry partner, CETREL, for their collaboration within this project. 11
References
[1] N. Antunes, N. Laranjeiro, M. Vieira, and H. Madeira. Effective detection
of SQL/XPath injection vulnerabilities in web services. In Proceedings of the
6th IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC ’09), pages
260–267, 2009.
11http://www.cetrel.lu
26
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
[2] N. Antunes and M. Vieira. Detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities in web
services. In Proceedings of the 4th Latin-American Symposium on Dependable
Computing (LADC ’09), pages 17–24, 2009.
[3] D. Appelt, N. Alshahwan, and L. Briand. Assessing the impact of firewalls
and database proxies on sql injection testing. In Proceedings of the 1st Inter-
national Workshop on Future Internet Testing, 2013.
[4] C. Bartolini, A. Bertolino, E. Marchetti, and A. Polini. Ws-taxi: A wsdl-based
testing tool for web services. In ICST, pages 326–335, 2009.
[5] T. Beery and N. Niv. Web application attack report, 2013.
[6] A. Ciampa, C. A. Visaggio, and M. Di Penta. A heuristic-based approach for
detecting SQL-injection vulnerabilities in web applications. In Proceedings of
the ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Systems (SESS ’10),
pages 43–49, 2010.
[7] J. Coffey, L. White, N. Wilde, and S. Simmons. Locating software features
in a soa composite application. In Web Services (ECOWS), 2010 IEEE 8th
European Conference on, pages 99–106, 2010.
[8] M. Cova, V. Felmetsger, and G. Vigna. Vulnerability analysis of web-based
applications. In L. Baresi and E. Nitto, editors, Test and Analysis of Web
Services, pages 363–394. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.
[9] B. Efron and R. Tibshirani. An Introduction To The Bootstrap, volume 57.
CRC press, 1993.
[10] I. A. Elia, J. Fonseca, and M. Vieira. Comparing sql injection detection tools
using attack injection: An experimental study. In Proceedings of the IEEE
21st International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE
’10), pages 289–298, 2010.
[11] J. Fonseca, M. Vieira, and H. Madeira. Testing and comparing web vulnera-
bility scanning tools for SQL injection and XSS attacks. In Proceedings of the
13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC
’07), pages 365–372, 2007.
[12] M. Fossi and E. Johnson. Symantec global internet security threat report,
volume xiv, 2009.
[13] X. Fu and K. Qian. SAFELI: SQL injection scanner using symbolic execution.
In Proceedings of the workshop on Testing, Analysis, and Verification of Web
Services and Applications (TAV-WEB ’08), pages 34–39, 2008.
[14] W. G. Halfond, J. Viegas, and A. Orso. A classification of sql-injection attacks
and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium
on Secure Software Engineering (ISSSE ’06), pages 13–15, 2006.
27
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
[15] W. G. J. Halfond and A. Orso. Amnesia: analysis and monitoring for neu-
tralizing SQL-injection attacks. In Proceedings of the 20th IEEE/ACM In-
ternational Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE ’05), pages
174–183, 2005.
[16] W. G. J. Halfond and A. Orso. Preventing SQL injection attacks using AM-
NESIA. In Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Software
Engineering (ICSE’ 06), pages 795–798, 2006.
[17] C. Holler, K. Herzig, and A. Zeller. Fuzzing with code fragments. In Proceed-
ings of the 21st Usenix Security Symposium, 2012.
[18] Y.-W. Huang, S.-K. Huang, T.-P. Lin, and C.-H. Tsai. Web application
security assessment by fault injection and behavior monitoring. In Proceedings
of the 12th International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW ’03), pages
148–159, 2003.
[19] Y. Jia and M. Harman. An analysis and survey of the development of mutation
testing. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 37(5):649–678, 2011.
[20] A. Kieyzun, P. J. Guo, K. Jayaraman, and M. D. Ernst. Automatic creation
of SQL injection and cross-site scripting attacks. In Proceedings of the 31st
International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’09), pages 199–209,
2009.
[21] I. Lee, S. Jeong, S. Yeo, and J. Moon. A novel method for SQL injection attack
detection based on removing SQL query attribute values. Mathematical and
Computer Modelling, 55(1):58–68, 2012.
[22] R. Sekar. An efficient black-box technique for defeating web application at-
tacks. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2009.
[23] H. Shahriar and M. Zulkernine. MUSIC: Mutation-based SQL injection vul-
nerability checking. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on
Quality Software (QSIC’08), pages 77–86. IEEE, 2008.
[24] L. K. Shar, H. B. K. Tan, and L. Briand. Mining sql injection and cross site
scripting vulnerabilities using hybrid program analysis. In Software Engineer-
ing (ICSE), 2013 35th International Conference on, pages 642–651, 2013.
[25] Y. Shin. Improving the identification of actual input manipulation vulnerabil-
ities. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Foundations
of Software Engineering, 2006.
[26] Y. Shin, L. Williams, and T. Xie. Sqlunitgen: Test case generation for sql
injection detection. North Carolina State University, Raleigh Technical report,
NCSU CSC TR, 21, 2006.
28
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
[27] B. Smith, L. Williams, and A. Austin. Idea: using system level testing for
revealing SQL injection-related error message information leaks. In Proceed-
ings of the 2nd International Conference on Engineering Secure Software and
Systems (ESSoS ’10), pages 192–200, 2010.
[28] SQL Injection Wiki. SQL injection cheat sheet.
http://www.sqlinjectionwiki.com/, 2013.
[29] The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). Testing for SQL
injection (owasp-dv-005). http://www.owasp.org, 2013.
[30] M. Vieira, N. Antunes, and H. Madeira. Using web security scanners to detect
vulnerabilities in web services. In Proceedings of the IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems Networks (DSN ’09), pages 566–571, 2009.
[31] W3C. Character entity references in HTML 4.
http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/sgml/entities.html, 2012.
[32] G. Wassermann and Z. Su. Sound and precise analysis of web applications
for injection vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN Con-
ference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI ’07),
pages 32–41, 2007.
[33] K. Wei, M. Muthuprasanna, and S. Kothari. Preventing SQL injection attacks
in stored procedures. In Proceedings of the Australian Software Engineering
Conference (ASWEC ’06), pages 191–198, 2006.
[34] Y. Xie and A. Aiken. Static detection of security vulnerabilities in script-
ing languages. In Proceedings of the 15th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium - Volume 15, USENIX-SS’06, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006. USENIX
Association.
29
Black-box SQL Injection Testing (TR-SnT-2014-1)
Appendix
| | | | |
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
 e
x
e
c.
 &
 f
la
g
. 
S
Q
L 
st
m
.(
M
a
)
SugarCRM -/- no App. Firewall
va
lue
ass
_us
er_
id
qu
ery
1
qu
ery
2
ord
er_
by
rel
_m
od
_qu
ery
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
 f
la
g
g
e
d
 S
Q
L 
st
m
.(
M
)
Figure 5: Results obtained from SugarCRM when no WAF was used. The box-
plots depict the results of µ4SQLi, the dashed line depicts the results of Std.
The box-plots are higher than the line, meaning that µ4SQLi performs better
than Std.
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Figure 6: Results obtained from HotelRS when no WAF was used: the box-plots
depict the results of µ4SQLi, the dashed line depicts the results of Std.
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